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INSURANCE REDLINING & THE FAIR
HOUSING ACT: THE LOST
OPPORTUNITY OF MACKEY v.
NATIONWIDE INSURANCE
COMPANIES
Redlining has been defined as "credit discrimination based upon the char-
acteristics of the neighborhood surrounding the borrower's dwelling."' Its
1. Conference of Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'ns v. Stein, 604 F.2d 1256, 1258 (9th Cir. 1979),
affid mem., 445 U.S. 921 (1980). There seems to be no end to the competing definitions of
redlining. "A neighborhood becomes redlined when a lending institution presumes the area is
no longer economically stable because of age, racial composition or other characteristics."
Note, Redlining: Remedies for Victims of Urban Disinvestment, 5 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 83, 83-
84 (1976) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). It is this presumption that makes redlining so
devastating, since the presumption soon becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. See infra note 108.
While the essence of redlining is geographical discrimination in home loans, most
definitions of redlining fall into two general categories. Racial redlining refers to
policies or practices by which lending institutions discriminate in the granting of, or
in the setting of terms for home loans based upon the perceived racial characteristics
(determined by present or projected occupants) of the neighborhood in which the
borrower wishes to live. Economic redlining refers to policies and practices of lend-
ers that consider certain geographical areas as zones of excessive economic risk, re-
gardless of the characteristics of the individual borrower or the property involved.
Note, Urban Housing Finance and the Redlining Controversy, 25 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 110, 110
n.1 (1976). "[R]edlining ... [occurs where] entire blocks or neighborhoods are simply de-
clared off limits for lending, either by having a line drawn around them, or by custom and
practice." Searing, Discrimination in Home Financing, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 1113, 1113
(1973).
It would be a serious mistake, however, to believe that redlining only affects ghetto areas.
By rejecting insurable risks simply because they are near "undesirable" areas, redlining spreads
urban decay and abandonment. Urban decay is spread because
[lienders do not necessarily reserve redlining treatment for slum areas alone. Dis-
favored areas may be well-maintained blue collar or middle income neighborhoods
characterized by aging but well-built housing stock. Frequently, these areas consist
of racially integrated, white ethnic, or black populations and border poorer commu-
nities. Such neighborhoods have been referred to as the 'building blocks of American
cities.' As such, their preservation is essential to the continuing vitality of entire
urban centers, particularly 'at a time when an energy shortage, [an] increase in hous-
ing costs, and a shift in values [are] leading many Americans to reconsider [these]
older, established communities as attractive places to live.'
Note, Attacking the Urban Redlining Problem, 56 B.U.L. REV. 989, 990 (1976) (footnotes
omitted).
The term redlining was first used to describe the insurance company practice of
marking in red on maps those geographical areas of a particular city in which home-
owner's insurance should not be sold. During the past few years, the term has been
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effects are both devastating and well-documented.2 Although the forms of
redlining have become more subtle, they have not been eliminated. Indeed,
the elimination of discriminatory redlining has been called vital if the pros-
pects of America's urban core, and those who live there, are to improve.3
The Fair Housing Act provides a wide ranging ban on a host of discrimi-
more frequently used to describe similar practices by financial institutions. The Fed-
eral Home Loan Bank Board has defined redlining as 'an arbitrary area discrimina-
tion practiced by financial institutions because of deterioration of neighborhoods,
without any consideration of the underwriting standards which comprise the basic
foundation on which a loan application is considered and/or appraised, compliance
with which will determine whether or not a loan is approved or denied.'
The most obvious example of redlining by banking institutions is the outright re-
fusal to make loans to an applicant because of the location of the property regardless
of the applicant's financial status and irrespective of the physical condition of the
property in question.
Hood & Weed, Redlining Revisited: A Neighborhood Development Bank as a Proposed Solu-
tion, I I URB. LAW. 139, 141 (1979) (footnotes omitted).
The following definition is adopted in this article whenever the term redlining is employed:
"Redlining shall refer to those lending practices that constitute arbitrary denials of financing
based on geographic location, racial or ethnic considerations, or any consideration which is not
justified on the basis of legitimate, demonstrable economic criteria. ... Ryan, Redlining,
1977 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 57, 57 n.1 (citing Mich. Governor's Task Force on Redlining, In-
terim Report 2 (1976)). This definition shall apply whether mortgage or insurance redlining is
being discussed. Even if there are statistical criteria for denying insurance on a territorial
basis, public policy concerns would outweigh these reasons and advise against denial of insur-
ance on such a basis.
2. "The unavailability of insurance coverage stemming from redlining has contributed to
the deterioration of American urban centers and has effectively frustrated attempts at urban
revitalization." Comment, Application of Title VIII to Insurance Redlining, 75 Nw. U.L.
REV. 472, 472 (1980) (footnote omitted). The effects of this practice have serious repercus-
sions for this nation's cities.
That this behavior is commonplace in an industry which provides a service as vital
as property insurance has devastating implications for the housing opportunities of
minorities. Disinvestment and building abandonment in redlined areas is accelerated
by skyrocketing maintenance and operating costs. Families with the means to do so
flee redlined areas, leaving behind the higher insurance costs and the stigma of the
residual market. Hard-pressed owners who have foregone property insurance cover-
age lack the capacity to rebuild after a fire. White flight, which accompanies disin-
vestment, almost invariably leads to accelerated racial and economic segregation.
Badain, Insurance Redlining and the Future of the Urban Core, 16 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS.
1, 35 (1980).
Insurance companies usually deny use of any factors associated with a geographic area and
claim only objective, reliable criteria are employed in the underwriting process. See DeWolfe,
Squires & DeWolfe, Civil Rights Implications of Insurance Redlining, 29 DE PAUL L. REV.
315, 316-17 (1980). For an excellent refutation of this contention, see Note, Property Insur-
ance and the American Ghetto. A Study in Social Irresponsibility, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 218, 233-
36 (1971) (the author claims that race is the true factor that insurance companies use to set
rates and terms or to deny the insurance altogether).
3. Badain, supra note 2, at 68. See also infra note 10.
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natory practices in the housing and real estate industry.4 It was passed by
Congress at the exhortation of President Johnson.5 In enacting the legisla-
tion, Congress made its first attempt to correct the widespread segregation in
housing that existed at the time. Through the Fair Housing Act, Congress
strove to fashion special legal weapons in the fight against many real estate
practices that forced blacks and other minorities to live apart from the rest
of society, often in ghettos of misery and squalor.6
Section 3604(a) of the Act makes it illegal to refuse to sell or rent or other-
wise to make housing unavailable based on a person's race.7 This provision
has been interpreted by the courts to prohibit various practices that, while
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1982). The Act prohibits a variety of discriminatory actions
on its face and by judicial construction. See infra notes 72-76, 141-57 and accompanying text.
5. Lamb, Congress, the Courts and Civil Rights: The Fair Housing Act of 1968 Revisited,
27 VILL. L. REV. 1115, 1116-27 (1982). In this article, Lamb makes the point that President
Johnson is widely neglected in being credited with passage of title VIII, as well as the entire
Civil Rights Act of 1968. Id. at 1116-27. Indeed, Lamb claims that without President John-
son's active support, the entire Act most likely would not have passed Congress. For a sum-
mary of behind-the-scenes machinations in the Senate, see Dubofsky, Fair Housing: A
Legislative History and a Perspective, 8 WASHBURN L.J. 149 (1969).
6. See President's Message to Congress Recommending a Program for Cities and Metro-
politan Areas, 1966-1 PuB. PAPERS (January 26, 1966) (Johnson states that racial discrimina-
tion lies at the center of the cities' housing problem).
Crowded miles of inadequate dwellings-poorly maintained and frequently over-
priced-is the lot of most Negro Americans in many of our cities. Their avenue of
escape to a more attractive neighborhood is often closed, because of their color.
The Negro suffers from this, as do his children. So does the community at large.
Where housing is poor, schools are generally poor. Unemployment is widespread.
Family life is threatened. The community's welfare burden is steadily magnified.
These are the links in the chain of racial discrimination.
Id. at 89.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (1982) provides:
[I]t shall be unlawful-
(a) To refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to
negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling
to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
(b) To discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of
sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection
therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
(c) To make, print, or publish, or cause to be made, printed, or published any
notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling
that indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin, or an intention to make any such preference, limitation,
or discrimination.
(d) To represent to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin that any dwelling is not available for inspection, sale, or rental when such
dwelling is in fact so available.
(e) For profit, to induce or attempt to induce any person to sell or rent any dwell-
ing by representations regarding the entry or prospective entry into the neighborhood
of a person or persons of a particular race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
1985]
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not specifically named within the Act, tend to result in making housing un-
available to minorities.'
Insurance redlining is the discriminatory refusal to issue homeowner's in-
surance irrespective of the property in question and the qualifications of the
applicant.' Insurance redlining effectively denies the availability of home
mortgages, because most lenders would never loan money without insured
property as security.'° Mortgage redlining plainly makes housing unavaila-
ble and is specifically prohibited by the Fair Housing Act." Whether the
related practice of insurance redlining makes housing unavailable within the
meaning of section 3604(a), and thus is impliedly prohibited by the Fair
Housing Act, is a subject of much recent judicial activity. 2
8. See United States v. City of Parma, 661 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456
U.S. 296 (1982) (prohibiting adoption of exclusionary ordinances by a municipality); United
States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975)
(prohibiting zoning ordinance that barred construction of any new multiple-family dwellings);
United States v. American Inst. of Real Estate Appraisers, 442 F. Supp. 1072 (N.D. Ill. 1977)
(prohibiting assignment of lower appraisal values to homes in racially integrated neighbor-
hoods), appeal dismissed, 590 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1978); Laufman v. Oakley Bldg. & Loan Co.,
408 F. Supp. 489 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (prohibiting mortgage redlining); Zuch v. Hussey, 394 F.
Supp. 1028 (E.D. Mich. 1975), af'd, 547 F.2d 1168 (6th Cir. 1977) (prohibiting steering of a
prospective buyer into or away from an area because of race); United States v. Hughes Memo-
rial Home, 396 F. Supp. 544 (W.D. Va. 1975) (prohibiting the rejection by a noncommercial
orphanage of minority orphans). See also infra notes 136-50 and accompanying text.
9. Badain, supra note 2, at 4. "In its traditional definition, 'redlining' is the outright
refusal of an insurance company or lending institution to provide services solely on the basis of
a property's geographical location." Id. (emphasis in original).
10. Dunn v. Midwestern Indem. Mid-Am. Fire & Casualty Co., 472 F. Supp. 1106, 1109
(S.D. Ohio 1979). The importance of insurance is difficult to overemphasize. In point of fact,
"[i]nsurance is essential to revitalize our cities. It is a cornerstone of credit. Without insur-
ance, banks and other financial institutions will not-and cannot make loans." Id. at 1109
(quoting Report by the President's National Advisory Panel on Insurance, Meeting the Insur-
ance Crisis of Our Cities (1968)).
11. See Laufman, 408 F. Supp. at 493. Section 3605 of the Fair Housing Act provides:
After December 31, 1968, it shall be unlawful for any bank, building and loan
association, insurance company or other corporation, association, firm or enterprise
whose business consists in whole or in part in the making of commercial real estate
loans, to deny a loan or other financial assistance to a person applying therefor for
the purpose of purchasing, constructing, improving, repairing, or maintaining a
dwelling, or to discriminate against him in the fixing of the amount, interest rate,
duration, or other terms or conditions of such loan or other financial assistance, be-
cause of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such person or of any
person associated with him in connection with such loan or other financial assistance
or the purposes of such loan or other financial assistance, or of the present or pro-
spective owners, lessees, tenants, or occupants of the dwelling or dwellings in relation
to which such loan or other financial assistance is to be made or given: Provided,
That nothing contained in this section shall impair the scope or effectiveness of the
exception contained in section 3603(b) of this title.
42 U.S.C. § 3605 (1982).
12. See, e.g., Mackey v. Nationwide Ins. Cos., 724 F.2d 419 (4th Cir. 1984).
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A related issue involves the McCarran-Ferguson Act.13 This Act was
passed by Congress in response to the Supreme Court's decision holding in-
surance to be commerce."4 The effect of the Act was to leave to the states
the regulation of insurance and related activities. 5 Under the Act, the fed-
eral government may regulate insurance only to the extent that the states
have not. 6 The Act exempts the insurance industry from any federal law or
act of Congress if it would "impair, invalidate, or supersede" any existing
state law. 7 Consequently, any examination of whether the Fair Housing
Act prohibits insurance redlining must necessarily first involve a determina-
tion whether the McCarran-Ferguson exemption applies.
In Mackey v. Nationwide Insurance Companies,18 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that insurance redlining was not pro-
hibited under the Fair Housing Act.' 9 Mackey was a black insurance agent
terminated by defendant.2" He brought an action alleging that Nationwide
had discriminated against him by redlining certain predominantly black
neighborhoods, thereby preventing him from making insurance sales.2 '
Nationwide's motion for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted was allowed by the district judge.22 The lower court found that the
McCarran-Ferguson Act shielded the alleged redlining practices from chal-
lenges under the Sherman Act, the Fair Housing Act, and the Civil Rights
13. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1982).
14. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944). See infra
notes 30-40 and accompanying text.
15. Kimball & Boyce, The Adequacy of State Insurance Rate Regulation: The McCarran-
Ferguson Act in Historical Perspective, 56 MIcH. L. REV. 545, 554-56 (1958).
16. Section 1012 provides in part:
(a) State regulation. The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein,
shall be subject to the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation or
taxation of such business.
(b) Federal regulation. No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, im-
pair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the
business of insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such
Act specifically relates to the business of insurance: Provided, That after June 30,
1948, the Act of July 2, 1890, as amended, known as the Sherman Act [15 U.S.C.
§§ 1-7 (1982)], and the Act of October 15, 1914, as amended, known as the Clayton
Act [15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1982)], and the Act of September 26, 1914, known as the
Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended [15 U.S.C. §§ 41-45 (1982)], shall be
applicable to the business of insurance to the extent that such business is not regu-
lated by State Law.
15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1982).
17. Id.
18. 724 F.2d 419 (4th Cir. 1984).
19. Id. at 423.
20. Id. at 420.
21. Id.
22. Id.; see FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
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Acts of 1866 and 1871.23
The Fourth Circuit permitted an immediate appeal pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b).24 While not adopting all of the reasoning of
the district judge, the court nonetheless determined that the claim was not
one upon which relief could be granted. 2" Specifically, it found that the Mc-
Carran-Ferguson Act barred the application of the Sherman Act.2 6 The
court allowed the adjudication of the claims under both the Fair Housing
Act and the Civil Rights Acts27 but, upon analysis of those claims, found
that there were no violations. Accordingly, the court upheld the lower
court's dismissal.28
This Note will examine briefly the background and purpose of both the
McCarran-Ferguson Act and the Fair Housing Act. It will then analyze the
only case in which insurance redlining was found to violate the Fair Housing
Act, Dunn v. Midwestern Indemnity. 29 The court's reasoning, use of legisla-
tive history, and method of statutory construction in Mackey will be ex-
amined and contrasted with Dunn. An assessment of the impact of Mackey
will conclude the article.
I. THE MCCARRAN-FERGUSON ACT
The McCarran-Ferguson Act was passed in response to the Supreme
Court decision of United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association.30
Previously, it was generally held that insurance was not commerce and,
therefore, could not be subject to federal regulation. 3' As the insurance in-
dustry grew in scale and complexity, however, it became clear that the in-
dustry inevitably would be treated for what it was--commercial enterprise.3 2
23. Mackey, 724 F.2d at 420.
24. Id.
25. Id. The court stated: "While we do not adopt all of the reasoning of the district
judge, we affirm the dismissal of these claims for, as to each, there is a substantial ground
supporting the conclusion that the claim is not one upon which relief can be granted." Id.
26. Id. at 421.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 425.
29. 472 F. Supp. 1106 (S.D. Ohio 1979), appeal dismissed, No. 84-8377 (6th Cir. Nov. 9,
1984) (The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal in Dunn for failure to file
within the requisite 10 day period as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)(1982). The appeal was
filed 7 days late.).
30. 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
31. Kimball & Boyce, supra note 15, at 553. See also South-Eastern Underwriters Associa-
tion, 322 U.S. at 578. This concept orginated in Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868).
32. Kimball & Boyce, supra note 15, at 553. This result should have surprised no one
since
[t]he federal power under the commerce clause expanded during the 1930's, [and]
it became increasingly clear that in due time the complex national insurance business
[Vol. 34:563
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South-Eastern Underwriters was an action brought for violation of the Sher-
man Antitrust Act.33 In that case, the Supreme Court acknowledged the
commercial nature of the insurance industry.34 Insurance thus became sub-
ject to all applicable federal laws resulting in what has been described as a
virtual panic among insurance executives and various state government
officials.35
Consequently, Congress enacted protective legislation in its next session
exempting the insurance industry from existing applicable federal laws.36
However, insurance remained subject to federal law "to the extent that such
business [was] not regulated by State law." 37 Thus, by the provisions of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, no federal law could apply to insurance companies
if it would "impair, invalidate, or supersede" existing state law.38
The purpose of the McCarran-Ferguson Act was to allow the states to
continue in their traditional role as regulators of insurance and to increase
their active enforcement of their laws. 39 The industry, however, had devel-
would be declared subject to federal control under the commerce clause. At an ear-
lier date, when state regulation was a reality while federal regulation was in abey-
ance, insurance men often called for federal regulation of insurance. Insurance
companies sought relief 'from the aggressive acts of hostile [state] legislatures.' But
as federal regulation neared reality desire was replaced by pervasive fear.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
33. 322 U.S. at 534.
34. Id. at 553.
35. See, e.g., Editorial, The Nat. Underwriter, Life Ins. ed., June 9, 1944, at 1, where it is
asserted that
Insurance D Day fell just a few hours before Eisenhower's D Day. . . . [T]he
mental commotion of insurance men was pitiable, as their attention was torn between
invasion headlines and their efforts to apprehend the consequences of the epochal,
adverse U.S. Supreme Court decision. . . .Decisions upon which the whole system
of state supervision of insurance has been founded and under which the business has
operated apparently are juridical museum pieces.
Id. Not all hyperbole was limited to those interested in the insurance business. See Powell,
Insurance as Commerce, 57 HARV. L. REV. 937, 988 (1944). After realizing that Justice
Black's majority opinion in South-Eastern Underwriters was based upon the supposition that
most people would consider insurance a type of trade or commerce, Powell exclaims:
It is a little less than shocking to have a Justice of the Supreme Court invoke the
mere supposition of common knowledge among lesser breeds without the law as wor-
thy of consideration against the conclusion of a district court which preferred to
respect its obligation to be faithful to superior controlling precedents rather than to
traduce them by resort to vaguely indicated ancient locutions and to unspecified con-
temporary supposed common knowledge of supposed most persons.
Id.
36. Kimball & Boyce, supra note 15, at 554.
37. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1982).
38. Id.
39. Kimball & Boyce, supra note 15, at 571. The speed with which the bill was passed
testifies to the sense of urgency felt by Congress.
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oped close ties to state regulators by the time the Act was enacted,' raising
questions as to the effectiveness of state regulation.
As long as a state has enacted laws purporting to regulate insurance, ac-
tions cannot be brought in that state under federal law. Whether the state's
laws are enforced is not an issue into which the courts will inquire.4 ' One
The bill was introduced in the Senate on January 18, 1945. The President signed it
less than two months later. This hasty action attests to the sense of urgency that was
felt. Brevity of consideration made difficult the clear isolation of the issues involved,
and a wide variety of expressions are to be found in the Congressional Record as to
the intent of the Congress. The basic purposes of the bill were to preserve to the
states the power to regulate but to compel them to regulate more adequately.
Id. There is much room for doubt as to whether these purposes have been achieved. See infra
note 41.
40. Badain, supra note 2, at 19. This relationship has been termed a "classic case of in-
cest." Hearing on the Operation of Urban Property Protection and Reinsurance Program Before
the Subcomm. on Housing of the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
349 (1965) (statement of Rep. William Mo~rhead). In a similar fashion, it has been said that
"there is a revolving door between the insurance industry and the office of the chief state
insurance regulatory officer." DeWolfe, Squires & DeWolfe, Civil Rights Implications of In-
surance Redlining, 29 DE PAUL L. REV. 315, 325 (1980). See also infra note 41.
41. The leading case on this point is Ohio AFL-CIO v. The Ins. Rating Bd., 451 F.2d
1178 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 917 (1972) (where an action was brought alleging
that the state regulation of insurance was a "sham" and a "mere pretense"). The United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit refused to examine whether state statutes were being
adequately enforced. It held simply that for the McCarran-Ferguson exemption to apply, all
that needed to be shown was that the state had "generally authorized or permitted certain
standards of conduct." 451 F.2d at 1182 (citing California League of Indep. Ins. Producers v.
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 175 F. Supp. 857, 860 (N.D. Cal. 1959)). The court stated
flatly:
We find no support for the appellants' argument that the court in this case should
inquire into the question as to whether the statutes of Ohio have been effectively
enforced in accordance with their terms. . . . [T]here is nothing in the language of
the McCarran Act or in its legislative history to support the thesis that the Act does
not apply when the state's scheme of regulation has not been effectively enforced.
Id. at 1184. This ignores, of course, the fact that the task of inquiring into whether the statutes
are being adequately enforced is no more difficult than any number of problems courts must
regularly solve. See Kimball & Boyce, supra note 15, at 567.
In his dissent from denial of certiorari, Justice Douglas cogently stated:
A governmental regulatory agency which in contradiction of a statutory direction,
only rarely exercises its examinatory powers; which has never exercised its power of
review of rate increases; and which does not even employ the personnel which would
be necessary to exercise the power would prima facie seem to be no more than a
'mere pretense' of regulation. Perhaps a full hearing would show otherwise. But
enough has been tendered to make the trial court's dismissal of the complaint im-
proper and makes this petition a clear grant.
Ohio AFL-CIO, 409 U.S. at 918 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
This observation echoes the remarks of commentators who point to statutes currently in
force in many states, but rarely, if ever, enforced. Without more, unenforced statutes allow
insurance companies the greatest leeway possible. Indeed, "[r]eal regulation is only partially
the result of improved statutes. It depends, too, on the channeling of pressures, especially
[Vol. 34:563
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effect of this indifference is to shield insurance companies from antidis-
crimination laws.42 Yet there have been cases in which the McCarran-Fer-
guson Act was not invoked, even though the state had enacted various
regulatory laws.43
The major case allowing antidiscrimination laws to reach the insurance
industry is Ben v. GMAC." Ben involved an action alleging violations of
both the Truth-in-Lending Act and the Civil Rights Acts. While the United
States District Court for the District of Colorado held that McCarran-Fer-
guson barred the Truth-in-Lending claim,45 it allowed the adjudication of
the alleged civil rights violation.4 6 The court reasoned that Congress' intent
in enacting McCarran-Ferguson did not include denial of access to federal
courts for a violation of one's constitutional rights.47 Even if Congress in-
through municipal politics, in such a way as to compete effectively with the highly organized
insurance industry. It also depends on the vigor and the attitudes of incumbent commission-
ers." Kimball & Boyce, supra note 15, at 561.
Had Dunn not been dismissed as untimely filed, but been properly certified to the same
circuit court of appeal that decided Ohio AFL-CIO, there was speculation that the court would
"have a further opportunity to determine whether any greater standard of regulation will be
required for civil rights issues than for issues of trade and commerce." Jordan, Property and
Fair Housing, 18 FORUM 223, 244 (1983). It seems likely that at some point a case involving
similar redlining issues as existed in Dunn will be heard by the Sixth Circuit. The Court of
Appeals will thus have an opportunity to affirm the reasoning in Dunn, as well as to reject the
results of the Fourth Circuit Court in Mackey.
The insurance industry may yet find itself regulated by the federal government even in the
area of trade and commerce, to say nothing of the more probable area of civil rights. The lack
of enforcement by states may backfire and at least one commentator has opined:
Unless state regulation is sufficiently stringent to prevent the development of sub-
stantial and organized consumer pressures, an attitude favorable to federal interven-
tion may develop, or federal agencies may have excuse to expand the scope of their
operations into the insurance field. It is at least possible that the Department of
Justice might successfully assert federal power under existing law, where state regula-
tion is nominal.
Kimball & Boyce, supra note 15, at 570.
42. See, e.g., Peters v. Wayne State Univ., 691 F.2d 235 (6th Cir. 1982), vacated, 103 S.
Ct. 3566 (1983) (holding an insurer is not bound by title VII because it furnishes services to a
title VII employer).
43. See, e.g., Spirt v. Teacher's Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 691 F.2d 1054 (2d Cir. 1982) (hold-
ing the McCarran-Ferguson Act does not prevent application of title VII to sex segregated
mortality tables in the computation of fixed annuity benefits); Women in City Gov't v. City of
New York, 515 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding the McCarran-Ferguson Act does not
prohibit application of title VII to sex differentiated actuarial tables); Equal Employment Op-
portunity Comm'n v. Wooster Brush Co., 523 F. Supp. 1256 (N.D. Ohio 1981) (holding the
McCarran-Ferguson Act inapplicable in an action alleging an unlawful discriminatory denial
of pregnancy related disability benefits).
44. 374 F. Supp. 1199 (D. Colo. 1974).
45. Id. at 1201.
46. Id. at 1202.
47. Id.
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tended to effect such a result, the court stated, "It is highly questionable that
Congress had the power under the Constitution to do so."
48
In Ben, the district court reviewed the legislative history of the McCarran-
Ferguson Act and concluded that the Act's power was to exempt insurance
from antitrust laws and nothing more.49 The court reasoned that, otherwise,
access to the federal courts as a judicial forum would be foreclosed.5" This
would be unacceptable, in the court's opinion, because federal courts are the
primary and most powerful forum for vindicating the rights given by the
Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States.5
Spirt v. Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association52 is the leading sex-
based discrimination case allowing insurance matters to come within the
scope of federal laws.5 3 Finding a violation of title VII involving the use of
sex-segregated mortality tables in the computation of fixed annuity bene-
fits,54 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that
Congress had no intention "of declaring that subsequently enacted civil
rights legislation would be inapplicable to any and all of the activities of an
insurance company that can be classified as the 'business of insurance. ""'
In a similar case, Women in City Government United v. City of New
York, 56 the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York held the McCarran-Ferguson Act did not preclude the application of
title VII to an alleged violation involving the use of a sex-differentiated actu-
A brief review of the background and history of the McCarran Act and the Civil
Rights Act will demonstrate that Congress, in enacting the McCarran Act had no
intent to deny access to the Federal Courts for redress of violations of a person's civil
rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.
Id.
48. Id. at 1203.
49. The court noted:
Congress reacted [to South-Eastern Underwriters] with a prompt enactment of the
McCarran Act, the effect of which was to permit continued regulation by the several
states of the business of insurance to the end that such business was exempt from the
federal anti-trust law to the extent that such business was regulated by state law.
Id. at 1202.
50. Id. at 1203. Moreover, if the federal forum were closed because of McCarran-Fergu-
son, it would represent a singular withdrawal of protection for the benefit of one industry.
DeWolfe, Squires & DeWolfe, supra note 40, at 327.
51. Ben, 374 F. Supp. at 1202-03 (quoting Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 245-48
(1967), citing F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT: A
STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 65 (1927)).
52. 691 F.2d 1054 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 247 (1984).
53. Jordan, supra note 41, at 238-43.
54. Spirt, 691 F.2d at 1062-63.
55. Id. at 1065.
56. 515 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
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arial table." Women in City Government saw the McCarran-Ferguson ex-
emption primarily in terms of commerce and stressed that "Congress did not
intend the McCarran-Ferguson Act as a limitation of its power to enact civil
rights legislation that might incidentally affect the business of insurance. "
58
These cases point the way to limiting the otherwise blanket immunity of
the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Their rationales appear firm, but it remains to
be seen if this trend will continue or if courts will remain willing to shield
insurance companies from antidiscrimination laws.59
II. THE FAIR HOUSING ACT
The Fair Housing Act was enacted as title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of
1968' and was promulgated under the authority of the thirteenth amend-
ment.6 The Act forbids racial discrimination in the sale and rental of hous-
ing or in associated services.62 Discrimination in the financing of home sales
or rentals is also barred.63
The Act attempted to alleviate the many inequities in housing in this
country.' 4 Passed in the wake of the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr., the Act was seen as a tool in eliminating the segregated housing
patterns then in existence.65 Whether the Act that finally emerged from
Congress was capable of such a task is open to question.66 Certainly there
remains much to be done to improve housing today.67
57. Id. at 306.
58. Id. at 303 (footnote omitted). Other commentators agree with this rationale, arguing
that applying the McCarran-Ferguson exemption to the business of insurance qua business of
insurance would allow for peaceful coexistence of the Act with civil rights laws. DeWolfe,
Squires & DeWolfe, supra note 40, at 328.
59. See supra note 42. However, in Arizona Governing Comm. v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073
(1983), the Supreme Court decisively stated that title VII prohibits employers from allowing
insurance companies participating in deferred compensation plans to use sex based annuity
tables.
60. Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, title VIII, §§ 801-19, 82 Stat. 81-89
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1982)).
61. United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 214 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934
(1972).
62. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(a)-3604(b) (1982).
63. Id. §§ 3605, 3606.
64. Dubofsky, supra note 5, at 153-54. See also infra note 67 for a current assessment of
housing conditions in the United States.
65. See 114 CONG. REC. 3421-22 (1968) (remarks of Sen. Mondale).
66. See infra notes 77-87 and accompanying text.
67. Lamb, supra note 5, at 1115-16. Current housing conditions for minorities in America
remain shocking.
According to statistics compiled by the Bureau of the Census for 1978, a majority
of the black households in the United States do not own their own homes, while
more than two-thirds of white households do. Of the black households which rent
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The legislative history of the housing bill reveals that it resulted not so
much from planned political deliberation as from the time of crisis in which
it was passed.68 Congress had been extremely hostile to any sort of fair
61housing initiative. President Johnson, however, was strongly committed to
the enactment of laws providing for fair and decent housing for all people."°
With President Johnson's strong support, Senate liberals were able to
achieve a substantial civil rights victory with the passage of title VIII.7
The Fair Housing Act was actually a Senate amendment to a House civil
rights bill. The prefatory language of the Act states: "It is the policy of the
United States to provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair housing
throughout the United States." 7 2 Title VIII prohibits discrimination on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin in the sale or rental of
private or public housing. 73 The Act specifically focuses upon discrimina-
tion involving the sale or rental of housing,74 the financing of housing,75 and
the extension of brokerage services.76
The Act has weak enforcement provisions, however, which represent the
political price paid in getting the measure through the Senate. 7 The Act
places ultimate administrative responsibility in the Secretary of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD).71 Unfortunately, the Secretary may only pur-
sue a complaint by "informal methods of conference, conciliation and per-
their homes, almost a third report signs of rats or mice. Twenty percent of the black
households which rent have open cracks or holes in their interior walls, and have
abandoned buildings on their streets. Almost seven percent of all black house-
holds-both renters and homeowners-lack plumbing facilities. More than eight
percent of black households which rent have holes in their floors, and more than five
percent have exposed wiring in their homes.
Id. (citing BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, ANNUAL HOUSING SURVEY:
1978 pt. B, at 11-14 (1981) (footnotes omitted)).
68. The Act has been called the "result of a political compromise, a product more of the
desire for passage than the desire for a rational scheme for uprooting discrimination." Note,
Discrimination in Employment and Housing: Private Enforcement of the Civil Rights Acts of
1964 and 1968, 82 HARV. L. REV. 834, 835 (1969) (footnote omitted). The compromise that
resulted in the Act's weak enforcement provisions has come to be regretted. See Fair Housing
Amendments Act of 1979, Hearings on S. 506 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the
Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 1-4 (1979) (statement of Hon. Birch Bayh,
subcomm. chairman) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings].
69. Lamb, supra note 5, at 1116-27.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1126.
72. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1982).
73. Id. §§ 3604(a)-3604(e).
74. Id. § 3604.
75. Id. § 3605.
76. Id. § 3606.
77. Lamb, supra note 5, at 1120. See also Dubofsky, supra note 5, at 156-57.
78. 42 U.S.C. § 3608 (1982).
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suasion. ' ' 79 Consequently, any action taken by HUD occurs on a case-by-
case basis, a generally ineffective approach. 80
Moreover, HUD may not initiate lawsuits nor request a federal court to
issue an injunction or restraining order.8' All it may do is refer cases to the
Justice Department, if the case involves "a pattern or practice" of discrimi-
nation. 2 Additionally, if a state has established a local agency that provides
rights and remedies that are substantially the same as those provided by the
Fair Housing Act, then HUD must refer its complaints to the local
agency.8 3 There the complaints often are neglected.84 For this and other
reasons, the Fair Housing Act has been called "a law without teeth,",85 "an
empty promise,"8 and a "paper tiger."
87
Even so, the Act has brought some advances. The Act has been construed
broadly to prohibit many discriminatory practices not specifically mentioned
in its language. 88 Further, the opportunity to strengthen the enforcement
provisions of the Act remains part of this nation's unfinished civil rights
agenda.89 Attempts to amend the Act for this purpose have failed thus far.9°
Although a great deal remains to be done to improve housing,9' the Act
reflects, at a minimum, national awareness of the problem and an effort to
solve it.
III. INSURANCE REDLINING
A. The Hidden Impact of Insurance Redlining
At first glance, redlining may not appear significantly harmful. 92 A brief
79. Id. § 3601(a).
80. See generally Senate Hearings, supra note 68, at 188-99 (remarks of William J. Taylor,
Chairman, Compliance and Enforcement Committee, Leadership Conference on Civil Rights).
81. Lamb, supra note 5, at 1133-34.
82. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 361 l(g), 3613 (1982); see also Senate Hearings supra note 68, at 23.
83. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(d) (1982). Indeed, one author actually recommends that attorneys
be watchful for state laws equivalent to federal laws, the clear inference being that action on
the state level is slower, less effective, and more advantageous to defendant insurance compa-
nies. Jordan, supra note 41, at 226-28.
84. Lamb, supra note 5, at 1134-37.
85. Senate Hearings, supra note 68, at 21.
86. Id. at 4.
87. Id. at 23.
88. See supra note 8, infra notes 136-50 and accompanying text.
89. Senate Hearings, supra note 68, at 188-89 (statement of William J. Taylor).
90. See H.R. 3504, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); H.R. 2540, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979);
H.R. 5200, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
91. See supra note 67.
92. Memorandum of Amici Curiae National Committee Against Discrimination in Hous-
ing, Montgomery County Fair Housing Center, Housing Opportunities Made Equal of Rich-
mond, Virginia, Inc., Baltimore Neighborhoods, Inc., and Housing Advocates, Inc., in support
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examination of the role insurance underwriting plays in housing and real
estate, however, reveals its true effect.9"
Insurance underwriting is the process by which companies determine
whether to accept or to reject an application for insurance coverage. 94 In-
surance companies, by their very nature, seek to accept "good" risks while
excluding or limiting "bad" risks.95 In this way, a company hopes to maxi-
mize its profits. There is nothing inherently suspect about this, provided
that the reasons for refusals are legitimate.96 This has been called "fair dis-
crimination". 97 "Unfair discrimination" describes the practice of assigning
risks to property that do not correctly reflect the property's particular loss
potential.9" In some respects, all insurance underwriting is "unfair" in that
basic underwriting considerations reflect generalizations rather than true
statistical evidence of risk.9 9 Redlining is a form of "unfair discrimination"
of appellant's petition for rehearing en banc at 20, Mackey v. Nationwide Ins. Cos., 724 F.2d
419 (4th Cir. 1984) [hereinafter cited as Memorandum].
93. See generally Badain, supra note 2, at 4-19. See also DeWolfe, Squires & DeWolfe,
supra note 40, at 316-21.
94. Badain, supra note 2, at 12-19.
95. Id.
96. See Jennings, Redlining-Now Insurers Are Guilty of It, Too, 8 REAL ESTATE L.J.
323, 330 (1980). In this article, the author sketches various practices that have been outlawed
by the Fair Housing Act. These practices include blockbusting, steering, refusals to sell, illegal
zoning, illegal city construction projects, illegal lending practices and violations by appraisers.
Yet, the author concludes: "A refusal to sell for tax reasons is legitimate .... A refusal to
insure because of high arson or burglary rates is legitimate. But these legitimate reasons must
control, and any conclusions about neighborhood makeup must remain dormant. We still
have the right of refusal for the right reason." Id.
97. Badain, supra note 2, at 15 n.76.
98. Id.
99. The arbitrariness of property insurance underwriting standards is illustrated in the
following exchange between Senator Metzenbaum and William Gibson, Vice President and
Associate General Counsel of the Continental Insurance Company, quoted in Rights & Reme-
dies of Insurance Policyholders.- Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Citizens and Shareholders
Rights & Remedies of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 95th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 83 (1978).
The Senator read an excerpt from The Continental Insurance Companies Personal Lines Un-
derwriters' Manual:
'The following occupations should, in our opinion, be included among those that
will, as a group produce higher than average frequency of loss ratio: advertising
agencies, painters, antique dealers, professional athletes, radio and television stations,
waiters and waitresses, fashion designers.' Why would a painter or a waitress or an
antique dealer or a fashion designer pose any unusual risk as a homeowner? Do they
break more things or what? Do they have more things stolen or do they bring their
homes down?
Id. Gibson answered, quoting from the manual's preamble:
'While we admittedly cannot readily document our opinions on this and many
other points, we are nevertheless, convinced without the slightest reservation that
when considered as a group rather than individuals, persons engaged in some occu-
pations have a greater frequency of loss under homeowners policies than persons
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based solely upon the characteristics of a particular area.l°°
Property insurance is an absolute prerequisite for credit, which in turn is
necessary for property ownership and maintenance.'0 l The denial of insur-
ance, therefore, effectively precludes the maintenance and improvement of
property. Further, the denial of insurance through redlining precludes the
maintenance of entire neighborhoods. 12 For the most part, these neighbor-
hoods represent old urban areas. 10 3 Sometimes the redlined area is in a state
of economic decline;" sometimes the racial or ethnic composition of the
neighborhood is changing.' 0 5 In any event, redlining of the neighborhood
almost certainly guarantees that economic decline will follow.106 Redlining
has therefore been characterized as a "self-fulfilling prophecy."
10 7
The process of inner city deterioration is a complex one. Insurance redlin-
ing contributes to and accelerates the deterioration process.108 The effect of
engaged in some other occupations.' This is again the collective opinion of people
who are attempting to find a way to make a profit in a highly competitive business.
Id.
Other insurance manuals have explicit instructions to practice geographical redlining. One
underwriting manual trumpeted: "[D]eteriorating neighborhoods automatically provide claim
problems due to vandalism, poor housekeeping, and inadequate maintenance . . . . Avoid
new business and reunderwrite renewal business which is being surrounded by neighborhoods
of this type." PRESIDENT'S NAT'L ADVISORY PANEL ON INS. IN RIOT-AFFECTED AREAS,
MEETING THE INSURANCE CRISIS OF OUR CITIES 1, 29 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Hughes
Panel].
100. For a discussion of the definition of "redlining," see supra note 1.
101. See Badain, supra note 2, at 1.
102. See generally id. at 1-12.
103. ILL., IND., MICH., MINN., OHIO AND Wis. ADVISORY COMMITTEES TO THE U.S.
COMMISSION OF CIVIL RIGHTS, INSURANCE REDLINING: FACT NOT FICTION 1 (1979) [here-
inafter cited as FACT NOT FICTION].
104. DeWolfe, Squires & DeWolfe, supra note 40, at 317.
105. FACT NOT FICTION, supra note 103, at 10.
106. DeWolfe, Squires & DeWolfe, supra note 40, at 318.
107. Badain, supra note 2, at 6. See also Comment, supra note 2, at 486.
108. Badain, supra note 2, at 5.
Redlining did not begin in the mid-I 960s, nor is it the sole invention of a malevo-
lent insurance industry. Rather, the roots of the problem are traceable to an assort-
ment of federal housing, transportation and procurement policies in the post-war era,
which have encouraged the decentralization of the American population at the ex-
pense of its older cities. Property insurers, anxious to reach the growing market of
suburban, upwardly mobile families in newly-constructed homes, developed the
homeowners' package in the mid-1950's. The package offered built-in economies
through a single indivisible premium which covered a multitude of perils (e.g., fire,
burglary, theft and personal liability), but was tendered only to the most desirable
residential risks.
Insurance is one industry whose profitability depends on 'adverse selection'-i.e.,
selling to the lowest-risk customers. This both reduces costs and maximizes profit-
ability within a company's legal allowable surplus-to-premiums written capacity.
Perceiving central city business to be riskier, insurance companies joined the exodus
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redlining is to stop any further investment in the area redlined.1 °9 With no
sources of financing for growth, repair or sale of housing, stagnation sets in
because attempts to improve the community are precluded by a lack of fund-
ing.11 ° This process is called disinvestment... and is closely related,
although not identical to, redlining.1 12 The net effect of redlining and disin-
vestment is the spread of ghettos one block at a time. 1 3
B. The Inadequate Federal Response to Insurance Redlining
In the wake of widespread rioting during the late 1960's, the President's
National Advisory Panel on Insurance Availability (the Panel or the Hughes
Panel) was charged with examining "the causes and effects of inner-city in-
surance unavailability and [devising] a solution to this dilemma." '114 The
Panel found that riots were only one factor in the problem of insurance un-
of the affluent and the middle class from the inner city to America's suburbs while
gradually terminating or restricting the books of business of urban agents. The result
of the suburban out-migration was an ever-increasing unavailability of property in-
surance in the central city, reaching crisis proportions in some areas and precipitat-
ing a cycle of deterioration and housing abandonment. High premiums compelled
inner city residents and landlords to buy only very limited coverage. Inadequate
coverage forced premiums on available policies even higher. In addition, the unavail-
ability of property insurance forced lending institutions to curtail mortgage activity
in certain neighborhoods.
Once started, this cycle of disinvestment fed upon itself:
As insurance became increasingly difficult to obtain or. . .afford ... vacated
properties remained vacant since willing buyers could not obtain loans for want of
insurance to serve such loans; properties urgently in need of repair . . . declined
further as credit for such purposes could not be obtained in the absence of insur-
ance availability.
Id. at 5-6 (quoting FEDERAL INS. ADMINISTRATION, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
HOUSING & URBAN DEVELOPMENT, FULL INSURANCE AVAILABILITY 24 (1974) (footnotes
omitted) (emphasis added)).
109. See supra notes 2, 108. See also Hughes Panel, supra note 99, at 1.
110. See supra notes 10, 108.
111. Jennings, Preemption and State Anti-redlining Regulations: The Need for Clarifica-
tion, 11 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 225, 227 n.6 (1980).
The distinction between 'redlining' and 'disinvestment' is a fine one. Redlining
refers specifically to the practice of denying mortgage funds to a particular region
such as an inner city residential area. Disinvestment, however, embodies the collec-
tion of funds in one neighborhood through savings deposits and then investing those
funds in a different locale, i.e., using the savings of local urban residents to make
loans for homes in the suburbs or in another state. The sun belt-Florida, Georgia
and Texas-was built in part from funds disinvested from northern urban centers.
Id. (citations omitted).
112. Id.
113. Badain, supra note 2, at 34-37. The author lays the blame for the decline of neighbor-
hoods squarely at the feet of insurers, among others. Id. at 36.
114. Id. at 2. See also Hughes Panel, supra note 99, at 35-40.
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availability and documented "[w]idespread refusals to insure . . . even
where there had been no riots and where none were threatened. These were
based primarily upon neighborhood characteristics, most significantly racial
composition, without regard to the merits of the particular risk."'15
The Panel concluded that the industry had exaggerated its urban loss and
incorporated that exaggeration in underwriting manuals." 6 The Panel also
anticipated "white flight," predicting that those left behind would have less
reason to insure, and called for affordable insurance.' 17 It proposed that the
government offer noncancellable, low-cost riot insurance to companies par-
ticipating in "Fair Access to Insurance Requirements" (FAIR) plans." 8
Since the Panel had found the main cause of insurance unavailability to be
fear of catastrophic losses due to rioting, it felt that a government guarantee
would allow insurance companies to continue to provide basic property
insurance.' '9
Congress reacted favorably by adopting the Urban Property Protection
and Reinsurance Act of 1968 (UPPRA). 20 This contained the basic operat-
ing structure for state FAIR plans. It was widely believed the FAIR plans
would make insurance available to all "insurable risks."'' Regrettably, this
did not come to pass.' 22 The single most devastating factor upon the effec-
tiveness of FAIR was the higher rate it offered as compared to the voluntary
market.'2 3 Denied coverage in the voluntary market for whatever reasons,
rejected applicants found themselves paying appreciably higher premiums
for less coverage. '24 Some of the plan's rates were over three times those of
the voluntary market' 25 with the result that "risks often were 'written-out'
115. Badain, supra note 2, at 6 (footnote omitted).
116. Id.
117. Hughes Panel, supra note 99, at 8.
118. Id. at 7-8.
119. Id. at 2-7.
120. Pub. L. No. 90-448, title XI, 82 Stat. 555 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1749bbb to 1749bbb-21 (1982)) (subsection (11) of § 1749bbb-3 was repealed by Pub. L.
No. 97-35, title III, § 342(b)(3), 95 Stat. 420). The riot reinsurance program terminated on
November 30, 1983. Pub. L. 98-181, § 452(b)(1), 97 Stat. 1230, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1749bbb(b)(1)
(West Supp. 1984). However, approximately half the states have maintained the FAIR plans.
Telephone interview between Robert Hunter, Director of the National Insurance Consumer
Organization and Leah Wortham, Assistant Professor of Law, Catholic University School of
Law (Feb. 22, 1985).
121. Badain, supra note 2, at 8. "The FAIR plan may be described as servicing the
residual market, i.e., those risks not covered by the voluntary market." Id. at 7 n.30.
122. Id. at 8-9.
123. Id. at 9.
124. Id. This higher cost effectively prevents many applicants from obtaining insurance
and contributes to the overall failure of the FAIR plans. See Comment, supra note 2, at 489-
91.
125. Badain, supra note 2, at 9.
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by the voluntary market and then 'rated-out' by FAIR plans."' 26 This com-
bination of inadequate service and even higher prices was devastating for
communities. 1
27
The argument has been made that the "free market" will accommodate
applicants who have been discriminated against because other firms will step
in and take up the unsatisfied demand. 128 Given low consumer elasticity
and high vulnerability, this argument is specious at best. 129 Experience has
shown that those denied voluntary coverage and unable to afford the ex-
horbitant FAIR rates forego insurance coverage altogether, 3 ° thereby creat-
ing yet another self-fulfilled prophecy.
States provide no substantial help in this regard, as UPPRA left the fed-
eral government with precious little power of review over the state FAIR
plans.' State approaches to redlining are fraught with inadequacies.'
3 2
Most states simply have not enacted antiredlining legislation.' 33 Political
pressure by the insurance industry is substantial and effective.' 34
Insurance redlining has serious consequences for this nation's urban core.
Its damaging effects can hardly be overstated. Though well-intentioned,
UPPRA and FAIR have failed to remedy the serious shortage of insurance
available to inner-city residents.'35
126. Id. The effect is the same as an outright refusal to write the policy. See Comment,
supra note 2, at 487. It is doubtful that the unsuccessful applicant takes any comfort from the
fact that coverage is unavailable because it is unaffordable, rather than unobtainable at all.
Excessive cost is a significant factor in insurance unavailability. See id.
127. Badain, supra note 2, at 11.
128. Id. at 37.
129. Id. Moreover, the very fact that one is relegated to a state FAIR plan has negative
implications, and the availability of the FAIR plans is certainly no guarantee that economic
decline due to redlining will subside. DeWolfe, Squires & DeWolfe, supra note 40, at 351.
Indeed, it may be a signal for disinvestment by others. Id.
130. Badain, supra note 2, at 11-12.
131. Id. at 22.
132. Id. at 23-34.
133. Id. at 28.
134. The lack of state enforcement activity can be explained to a large degree by the
political calculus of the field. Insurance companies are a powerful lobby, with con-
siderable weight in the [state insurance] departments. In contrast, it is often difficult
for community groups to mobilize in this field. Few consumers are aware of their
rights and remedies. Cancellations, nonrenewals, refusals to write, and the charging
of excessive rates are individualized discriminatory practices. Although the sum-
mary effect of discrimination is to write-out or rate-out entire segments of urban
populations, the process toward that end is carried out on a one-to-one relationship
between consumer and company.
Id. at 30-31 (footnotes omitted).
135. See Note, supra note 2, at 237, where the author states that legislation is needed in
order to bring the insurance industry within the scope of the law.
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IV. DUNN V. MIDWESTERN INDEMNITY
In Dunn v. Midwestern Indemnity Midamerican Fire and Casualty Com-
pany,1 36 black homeowners brought an action against insurers for terminat-
ing their homeowner's insurance policy.' 37 Plaintiffs alleged that the
decision to terminate the portfolio of Borcher Insurance Company, through
which they had purchased the policy, was based upon the portfolio's inclu-
sion of a large number of black homeowners or people residing in black
neighborhoods.138 The United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of Ohio in Dunn considered only the question whether the homeowners
stated a claim for which relief could be granted under the Fair Housing
Act.' 39 In holding that a claim could be brought, the court became the first
federal court to decide so.'4°
A. The Fair Housing Act Construed as Prohibiting the Practice of
Insurance Redlining
The Dunn court afforded a "generous construction" to the Fair Housing
Act."' Section 3604(a), the court noted, made it unlawful to refuse to sell
or rent, "or otherwise [to] make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any per-
son because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.",' 42 The court
looked to the manner in which other courts had construed the pertinent
phrase "and otherwise make unavailable." It found many decisions barring
various practices that, like insurance redlining, were not specifically men-
tioned by the Act.' 43 Among those practices found by other courts to be
impliedly prohibited by the Fair Housing Act were: mortgage redlining;'
1
the rejection by a noncommercial orphanage of minority orphans;' 4 5 the
adoption of exclusionary ordinances by a municipality;' 4 6 the assignment of
lower appraisal values to homes in racially integrated neighborhoods;' 4 7 a
zoning ordinance prohibiting construction of any new multiple-family dwell-
136. 472 F. Supp. 1106 (S.D. Ohio 1979).
137. Id. at 1107.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Jordan, supra note 41, at 231.
141. Dunn, 472 F. Supp. at 1108.
142. Id.
143. Id. See supra note 8.
144. Dunn, 472 F. Supp. at 1108 (citing Laufman v. Oakley Bldg. & Loan Co., 408 F.
Supp. 489 (S.D. Ohio 1976)).
145. Id. (citing United States v. Hughes Memorial Home, 396 F. Supp. 544 (W.D. Va.
1975)).
146. Id. (citing United States v. City of Parma 661 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1981)).
147. Id. (citing United States v. American Inst. of Real Estate Appraisers, 442 F. Supp.
1072 (N.D. Ill. 1977)).
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ings; 4 and the steering of a prospective buyer into or away from an area
because of race.149 The Dunn court observed that other courts had found
the language of section 3604(a) was "as broad as Congress could have made
it.,150
The court in Dunn also gave great weight to the interpretation of the Act
by the Department of Housing and Urban Development.1 5' HUD had con-
cluded that insurance redlining makes mortgage money unavailable and
hence renders dwellings unavailable as effectively as denial on other
grounds. 152 The legislative history of the Act was found by the court to
support HUD's interpretation. 5 ' While cognizant of the omission of any
reference to insurance redlining during the legislative proceedings, the court
emphasized that the overriding purpose of the Act was to eliminate segrega-
tion in housing.1 54 Of particular importance in Dunn's analysis was the
Act's goal of eliminating any practice "which might prevent a person eco-
nomically able to do so from purchasing a house regardless of his race."' 55
Because one must have property insurance to purchase a house, the court
concluded, a discriminatory refusal of that insurance would prevent a per-
son, who was otherwise economically able, from obtaining housing.'5 6 In-
surance redlining was therefore held to be encompassed by the broad
language of section 3604(a), as well as by the overall legislative design."'
For support in making its causal connection between financing and hous-
ing, the court relied on Laufman v. Oakley Building & Loan Company.'5"
In Laufman, the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Ohio found that denial of financial assistance in connection with the
purchase of a house made that dwelling "unavailable." 59 If that denial re-
sults from racial considerations, the Laufman court concluded, section
148. Id. (citing United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974)).
149. Id. (citing Zuch v. Hussey, 394 F. Supp. 1028 (E.D. Mich. 1975), aftd, 547 F.2d 1168
(6th Cir. 1977)).
150. Id. (quoting United States v. Youritan Constr. Co., 370 F. Supp. 643, 648 (N.D. Cal.
1973), affid as modified, 509 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1975)).
151. Id. at 1109.
152. Id. (citing Memorandum of the General Counsel of Housing and Urban Development
to Chester McGuire, Assistant Secretary for Equal Opportunity (Aug. 15, 1978)).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. (quoting H.R. 3504, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 804 (1977)).
156. "Since insurance is a precondition to adequate housing, a discriminatory denial of
insurance would prevent a person economically able to do so from buying a house." Id.
157. "Consequently, although insurance redlining is not expressly proscribed by the Act, it
is encompassed by both the broad language of § 3604(a) and the legislative design of the Act
which seeks to eliminate discrimination within the housing field." Id.
158. 408 F. Supp. 489 (S.D. Ohio 1976).
159. Id. at 493.
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3604(a) is violated."6
Laufman was an action alleging violation of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964
and 1968 brought by homeowners against a building and loan association. 1
61
The plaintiffs claimed they were victims of redlining and that such practice
is prohibited by the Fair Housing Act. 162 In denying the defendant's motion
for summary judgment pursuant to rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the district court held that redlining constituted a basis for a
cause of action under both section 3604 and section 3605.163
The Laufman court noted that the high costs of housing require most
people to seek financial assistance when purchasing a home.'14 When denial
of this assistance is based on racial considerations, the court held, section
3604(a) is violated.'
65
Laufman relied, in part, on the interpretation by HUD that the Fair
Housing Act prohibits redlining. 6 6 The court noted that the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) had come to the same conclusion and had is-
sued detailed regulatory provisions to prevent redlining. 167 The court in
Laufman bolstered its use of agency interpretation by citing the Supreme
Court's opinion in Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance161 that HUD's
interpretation is "entitled to great weight" in construing the language of the
Act. 169
In Dunn, the defendant Midwestern argued that a proposed congressional
amendment to the Fair Housing Act, specifically prohibiting insurance red-
lining, indicated that section 3604(a) as originally enacted did not encom-
pass the practice. 7o The court rebuked this argument by stating that the
amendment was put forth by its sponsors as a clarification of existing law
and not as a new prohibition.' 7 ' To buttress this contention, the court cited
160. Id.
161. Id. at 491-92.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 491.
164. Id. at 493.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 494.
167. Id. The court cited, inter alia, 12 C.F.R. § 531.8(c)(6) (1976) which stated, in perti-
nent part: "The racial composition of the neighborhood where the loan is to be made is always
an improper underwriting consideration." Id. at 495.
168. 409 U.S. 205, 210 (1972).
169. Laufman, 408 F. Supp. at 494. The Laufman court went on to say that "this defer-
ence is particularly appropriate where, as here, the administrative practice in question involves
a contemporary construction of the statute by the officers charged with the responsibility of
setting its machinery in motion and of making its parts work smoothly and efficiently." Id. at
495 (quoting Board of Educ. v. HEW, 396 F. Supp. 203, 236 (S.D. Ohio 1975)).
170. 472 F. Supp. at 1109-10 (citing H.R. 3504, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978)).
171. Id. at 1110.
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comments by then Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Patricia
Harris, who stated that the proposed amendment was merely a codification
of existing case law.' 7 2 Since the Dunn court held that insurance redlining
violates section 3604(a), it did not reach the issue whether section 3604(b)
prevents discrimination by a third party once the sale has been completed.' 73
It noted, however, that the relevant phrase of section 3604(b) had also been
broadly construed.' 74
As to the alleged violation of section 3605, the court found that Midwest-
ern was not engaged in the requisite making of commercial real estate
loans.' 7 Accordingly, the court barred the claim. The court allowed
Dunn's section 3617 claim, however, because it had already found section
3604(a), encompassing section 3617, to have been violated.1
76
B. The McCarran-Ferguson Act Construed as Inapplicable to Insurance
Redlining Actions
In determining that the McCarran-Ferguson exemption did not apply, the
court in Dunn briefly sketched the histories of the exemption, UPPRA, and
FAIR. 177 It stated that UPPRA was enacted to shield insurance companies
from huge losses due to riots or other civil disorders. 171 It also noted that
UPPRA contained the basic operating structure of the state FAIR plan.
179
FAIR, the court found, allowed insurance companies to "dump" their
ghetto area policies.' This resulted in two separate insurance markets: a
"normal" market, served by private insurers, and a market consisting of the
172. Id. The court quoted Secretary Harris as stating:
I find the clarifying amendments in H.R. 3504 on insurance and lender redlining
practices helpful and necessary. While there are strong indications that such conduct
is reached by the existing law, the more explicitly the statute addresses these issues,
the more certain we can be that potential violators are fully aware of the conduct
prohibited. In addition, victims of such conduct could more easily secure redress in




175. Id. The court noted:
While § 3605 has application to an 'insurance company,' it is clear that the statute
has reference to institutions engaged 'in the making of commercial real estate loans.'
Even a broad construction of this section cannot alter its unambiguous meaning.
Thus § 3605 does not contemplate proscription of insurance redlining by an insur-
ance company not engaged 'in the making of commercial real estate loans.'
Id.
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urban inner core, served by FAIR.' 8 ' With discriminatory denial of access
to the normal insurance market and the relegation of minorities to the state
FAIR plans, a pervasive pattern of segregated housing developed and con-
tinued. '2 The elimination of this pattern was found in Dunn to be the spe-
cial province of the Fair Housing Act.' 83 Hence, the court found it "clear"
that neither the McCarran-Ferguson Act, UPPRA, nor FAIR addressed,
nor were intended to address, insurance redlining.'8 4 As a result, the court
declared that the McCarran-Ferguson exemption did not apply and denied
Midwestern's 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. 8 5
V. MACKEY v NA TIONWIDE INSURANCE COMPANIES
In Mackey v. Nationwide Insurance Companies, a black insurance agent
alleged he was discriminated against as a result of defendant's redlining of
certain black neighborhoods.' 8 6 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit declined to extend the reach of the Fair Housing Act to in-
surance redlining.'87 Construing the statutory language and interpreting the
legislative history of the Act, the court found no evidence that Congress
intended to prohibit insurance redlining through the Fair Housing Act.'
At the same time, Mackey joined the growing number of cases holding, for
various reasons, that the McCarran-Ferguson Act also did not apply.'8 9
181. Id. (citing Barker, The High Cost of Property Insurance in HUD Urban Core Housing
Development, 671 INs. L.J. 711 (1979)).
182. Id. at 1111-12.
183. Id. at 1112.
184. Id. While the court is essentially correct, the issues become confused in the court's
discussion. UPPRA and FAIR were established to attack the problem of insurance unavaila-
bility resulting from geographic redlining, while only title VIII goes to the problem of racial
redlining. See Comment, supra note 2, at 477.
When the court declares that UPPRA and FAIR were not intended to address redlining, it
is clearly wrong. The court saves its argument, however, through its definition of redlining:
"the restriction of insurance based on the racial composition of the neighborhood, apart from
any consideration of risk." Dunn, 472 F. Supp. at 1107 n.3. Under this definition, only title
VIII, and not UPPRA or FAIR, addresses the insurance redlining problem. Comment, supra
note 2, at 477 n.42. But see Jordan, supra note 41, at 235 (The author attempts to make the
difficult argument that UPPRA and FAIR were meant to combat redlining. A close reading
of this argument, however, reveals a blurring of the important distinction between insurance
redlining and general insurance unavailability.).
185. Dunn, 472 F. Supp. at 1112. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
186. 724 F.2d 419, 420 (4th Cir. 1984).
187. Id. at 423-25.
188. Id. at 423-24.
189. Id. at 421.
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A. The McCarran-Ferguson Act. No Law "Impaired, Invalidated, or
Superseded"
Senior Circuit Judge Haynsworth, writing for the majority in Mackey,
held that the McCarran-Ferguson Act barred Dunn's claims arising under
the Sherman Antitrust Act.' 90 The court found that the activity alleged by
the plaintiff to violate the Sherman Act clearly fell within the "business of
insurance" exemption provided for by the McCarran-Ferguson Act.' 9' The
court, however, went on to find that the exemption did not apply to Dunn's
claims under the Fair Housing Act and Civil Rights Acts because no law of
North Carolina would be "impaired, invalidated or superseded" by the ap-
plication of those Acts. 192 Nationwide challenged this conclusion. It argued
application of the Acts would impair North Carolina legislation that prohib-
its insurance companies from establishing discriminatory rates.193 The court
responded that while the state provision at issue might well prohibit unfair
discrimination in the establishment of rates, it did nothing to prevent dis-
criminatory practices in the acceptance of risks.194
The goals of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, Mackey declared, were to allow
the states to regulate the business of insurance' 5 and to provide a limited
190. Id. at 420.
191. Id. at 421.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 421 n.l. Midwestern argued that North Carolina General Statutes § 58-131.37
prohibits discrimination in the establishment of rates. Section 58-131.37 provides:
(a) Rates shall not be excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory.
(b) Rates are not excessive if a reasonable degree of price competition exists at the
consumer level with respect to the class of business to which they apply. It is pre-
sumed that a reasonable degree of price competition exists if there are a number of
insurers actively engaged in the class of business and there are rate differentials in
that class of business.
(c) If such competition does not exist, rates are excessive if they clearly produce a
long-run underwriting profit that is unreasonably high for the class of business.
(d) No rate shall be held to be inadequate unless (i) the rate is unreasonably low
for the insurance provided and the continued use of the rate endangers the solvency
of the insurer, or unless (ii) the rate is unreasonably low for the insurance provided
and the use of the rate by the insurer has, or if continued will have, the effect of
destroying competition or creating a monopoly.
(e) A rate is not unfairly discriminatory in relation to another in the same class if
it reflects equitably the differences in expected losses and expenses. Rates are not
unfairly discriminatory because different premiums result for policyholders with like
loss exposures but different expense factors, or like expense factors but different loss
exposures, as long as the rates reflect the differences with reasonable accuracy. Rates
are not unfairly discriminatory if they are averaged broadly among persons insured
under a group, franchise, or blanket policy.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-131.37 (1982).
194. Mackey, 724 F.2d at 421 n. 1.
195. Id. at 420.
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exception to the antitrust laws. 19 6 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit observed that these goals could be attained without dis-
missing the redlining claims.' 97 Since the court already had determined that
the redlining claim could be addressed under the Fair Housing Act,' 98 it
specifically declined to consider whether the McCarran-Ferguson Act pre-
cluded the application of federal civil rights statutes to the insurance
industry.' 99
The court affirmed the district court's holding that Mackey had no stand-
ing to challenge the alleged redlining practices under the Civil Rights
Acts.2°" The court, however, did find Mackey had standing under the Fair
Housing Act. It commented that the usual requirements for standing may
not prevent actions from being brought under the Act.2"'
196. Id.
197. Id. at 421. This view is strongly supported by most commentators. See generally
Kimball & Boyce, supra note 15, at 554-56.
198. Mackey, 724 F.2d at 421.
199. Id. at 421 n.2.
200. Id. at 421. On this point, the court admitted that the agent's loss of commission most
likely satisfied the constitutional requirement for standing that one must have suffered some
injury and have a personal stake in the outcome. Id. Yet the court found "prudential limita-
tions" to outweigh these minimum constitutional requirements. It stated: "The persons best
suited to challenge the redlining practice are those owners of homes and buildings who have
been the direct victims of the alleged discriminatory practice." Id. at 422.
As to Mackey's claim that he was punished for trying to vindicate the § 1981 and § 1982
rights of the home and building owners and was thus within the exception of Sullivan v. Little
Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229 (1969), the court noted that in Sullivan the standing to sue was
premised on the fact that Sullivan was the only effective adversary of the unlawful racial dis-
crimination. Mackey, 724 F.2d at 422. In the instant case, the court said, "There is no imped-
iment to actions by those blacks who were denied property insurance because of the alleged
discriminatory practice. Denying standing to Mackey does not insulate Nationwide from legal
accountability for any deprivation of § 1981 and § 1982 rights it may have committed." Id.
(footnote omitted).
This view of standing has been criticized on the ground that "[r]arely will the insured be in
such a position to challenge insurance redlining within the brief limitations period under the
Fair Housing Act. Not until the devastation that insurance redlining inevitably causes dries
up the well of available markets will most homeowners feel the impact of the practices that
victimize them." Memorandum, supra note 92, at 20. Further, the Mackey interpretation of
Sullivan has been characterized as "misread." Id. at 19.
201. Mackey, 724 F.2d at 422-23. The court relied upon Gladstone Realtors v. Village of
Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979), where the Supreme Court declared that Congress intended
standing under the Fair Housing Act to "extend to the full limits of Article III." Mackey, 724
F.2d at 422 (quoting Gladstone Realtors, 441 U.S. at 103 n.9). The Mackey court relied upon
Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1983), in stating that normal standing barriers
do not apply to the Fair Housing Act. Mackey, 724 F.2d at 422-23. Since all that Article III
requires is a showing of economic harm, the court found that Mackey had satisfied Article III.
Id at 423.
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B. The Fair Housing Act: The Past Ought Not Be Prologue
The Fourth Circuit in Mackey construed section 3604(a) of the Fair Hous-
ing Act as not reaching the practice of insurance redlining.2 °2 In so doing,
the court relied on several factors providing a series of touchstones for the
opinion.20 3 A careful examination of these factors in the aggregate suggests
that the court fundamentally misread the issues presented in Mackey.
The court focused on the Act's "or otherwise make unavailable" clause
and ruled that this was simply insufficient to encompass insurance redlin-
ing.2" The court rebuked Mackey's central argument that when property
insurance is denied due to discrimination, mortgages become unattainable
and housing thus becomes "unavailable" within the meaning of the Fair
Housing Act."'20 5 The court noted that section 3605 specifically prohibits
discrimination in housing financing.20 6 If section 3604 was meant to be as
broad in its prohibition of discriminatory acts as Mackey claimed, the court
reasoned, then section 3605 would be superfluous. 20 7
Turning to the legislative history of the Fair Housing Act, the court noted
that the term "insurance redlining" was never mentioned during the legisla-
tive proceedings.20 8 The court, however, failed to take notice of the peculiar
nature of the Act's legislative history. The major problem is that there is
very little legislative history reflected in the Congressional Record. 20 9 This
has been attributed to two factors: (1) the lack of committee reports due to
the fact that title VIII was a Senate amendment to a House civil rights
bill; 210 and (2) the emotional nature of the debate over title VIII. 21  Fur-
ther, it has been observed that the broad language of section 3604(a) was
pointed out to Congress during one of the few subcommittee hearings. 21 2
This suggests Congress' awareness and acceptance of the fact that the statute
202. 724 F.2d at 423.
203. Id. at 423-24.
204. Id. at 423.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. This conclusion is difficult to understand since § 3605 only deals with lending
institutions. The broad "or otherwise make unavailable" language of § 3604 seems designed to
encompass those many practices whose effect would deny dwellings based on racial
considerations.
208. Id.
209. Comment, supra note 2, at 480-81.
210. Id. at 481. For an overview of the legislative process that led to the enactment of the
Fair Housing Act, see generally Dubofsky, supra note 5, at 149-60. See also Lamb, supra note
5, at 1116-27.
211. Comment, supra note 2, at 481.
212. Id. at 482.
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could be broadly construed.21 3
The Mackey court did not consider this background. Instead, it took a
highly unusual approach to the legislative history.2" 4 The court noted that
several subsequent attempts to amend the Fair Housing Act failed to pass
Congress.215 These amendments would have specifically outlawed insurance
redlining, among other things.2" 6 The amendments' failure to pass was seen
by the court as evidence that Congress never intended to prohibit insurance
redlining.2" 7 More surprising, the Fourth Circuit relied on the statements of
two Congressmen who opposed the amendments for the proposition that
insurance redlining was never meant to be prohibited.2"8
The Mackey court took this view despite the fact that sponsors claimed
the amendments simply clarified existing law.2 19 Neither HUD's interpreta-
tion of the Act nor the remarks of Secretary Harris appear in Mackey. Like-
wise, testimony by spokesmen for the Justice Department and the United
States Commission on Civil Rights to the effect that current law prohibits
insurance redlining was ignored by the Mackey court. 2 20 The court's reli-
ance on subsequent members of Congress to devine the intent of the 1968
213. Id.
Since neither the sponsors of the legislation nor other subcommittee members at-
tempted to restrict the broad language, even though their attention had been called to
the potentially broad construction of the words, one can infer that the sponsors either
intended such a broad construction be given to the words used or were unconcerned
that such an interpretation could be so attached.
Id.
214. See infra note 221 and accompanying text.
215. Mackey, 472 F.2d at 424. The court seems not to realize that the amendments in fact
passed the House of Representatives and only failed in the Senate as a result of a filibuster.
For the story of the bill's defeat, see Bill to Strengthen Fair Housing Act Killed as Senate
Cloture Vote Fails, N.Y. Times, Dec. 10, 1980, at B8, col. 3.
216. See Senate Hearings, supra note 68, at 1-4.
217. Mackey, 472 F.2d at 424. The court explained:
Bills to amend the Act so as to prohibit discriminatory practices in the hazard
insurance industry were introduced in the House in 1978, 1979, and 1980. No such
amendment has been adopted. Since there is no reference to hazard insurance in the
1968 statute or in its legislative history, the failure of the proposed amendments is
supportive of our conclusion that the statute as enacted in 1968 was not intended to
reach the hazard industry.
Id.
The court clearly misses the nexus between insurance and mortgage loans, and hence, the
availability or unavailability of housing itself. One must have insurancefirst, since "[n]o mort-
gagor would be willing to lend money to a potential home buyer without having his or her
interest in the property protected." DeWolfe, Squires & DeWolfe, supra note 40, at 336. See
also Badain, supra note 2, at 42.
218. Mackey, 472 F.2d at 424.
219. Id.
220. Such testimony is never alluded to by the court. But see Dunn, 472 F. Supp. at 1107
n.2.
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Congress, especially in light of this conflicting evidence, is clearly of ques-
tionable value.
22 1
The Fourth Circuit actually invented reasons why Congress may have
prohibited mortgage redlining but not insurance redlining, 222 although the
result of each is identical.2 23 In essence, the court stated that Congress, rec-
ognizing the insurance industry's traditional role in classifying risks,224 may
have wanted to leave the industry free to choose acceptable risks and reject
excessive ones. 2 25  That Congress did not give mortgage lenders the same
latitude, the court asserted, was no reason to assume that Congress meant to
restrict insurance.
226
This analysis betrays a fundamental misunderstanding on the part of the
court in Mackey.22 7 The court is correct in suggesting that excessive risk is a
legitimate basis upon which to refuse either property insurance or a mort-
gage. 22' This, however, is not redlining. Redlining, by definition, is the dis-
criminatory refusal to insure, wholly apart from considerations of risk.
2 29
221. Comment, supra note 2, at 484.
[S]tatements by current individual legislators would not be indicative of the inten-
tion of the original enacting legislature. It is the intention of the enacting legislature
which governs the interpretation of the language adopted in 1968, and statements
made in a subsequent legislature have little probative value in determining the intent
of the legislature which enacted the original legislation.
Id. (citing United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 282 (1946)).
222. Mackey, 724 F.2d at 423.
223. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
224. Mackey, 724 F.2d at 423. The court stated:
Moreover, there are different considerations that may have influenced Congress in
shaping federal proscriptions of discrimination in financing and in insurance. The
insurance industry has traditionally classified risks. If insurance premiums are to
remain at reasonable levels for most householders, some insurers must be permitted
to reject risks which are perceived to be excessively high, while charging higher pre-
miums on some risks than upon others. It is not suggested that financial institutions
do not have greater risks in making mortgage loans in neighborhoods that are deteri-
orating than in other areas, but the fact that Congress chose to proscribe discrimina-
tion in mortgage financing does not suggest that it would have come to a similar




227. The court's analysis has rightly been called "alarming." See generally Memorandum,
supra note 92, at 14. The Memorandum accurately pinpoints the misunderstanding of the
court when it states, "It is precisely this willingness to assume that homes within black neigh-
borhoods are automatically undesirable as insurance risks that makes insurance redlining the
pernicious and self-fulfilling practice that it has become." Id. at 15.
228. See supra note 96.
229. See supra notes 1, 108, 167.
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This is precisely why its impact is so devastating. 23° Additionally, redlining
2311has a disproportionate impact on minorities. Mackey loses sight of the
fact that the purpose of the bill, according to its sponsor Senator Mondale, is
to replace the ghettos "by truly integrated and balanced living patterns.
'232
Having theorized that Congress intended to exclude insurance redlining
from the Act, the Fourth Circuit in Mackey seemed compelled to recognize
a different outlet for congressional prohibition of the practice. This is al-
leged to be accomplished through UPPRA and FAIR.2 33 Yet these pro-
grams should be considered more as a response to the riots of the late 1960's
than as a prohibition of redlining.234 Indeed, they may even assist in perpet-
uating racial segregation and urban blight.235
Mackey's review of the legislative history of the Fair Housing Act suggests
a predetermined conclusion that redlining was not within the Act's scope.
The court was forced to patch together disparate elements to support that
result. Statutory construction based on such a selective and arbitrary review
of the legislative history drains the Fair Housing Act of much of its force
and effectiveness.
C. Previous Case Law: Analytical Myopia
Mackey unequivocally rejected Dunn as a basis for interpreting the Fair
Housing Act to prohibit insurance redlining. 236 Mackey blithely brushed
aside the case upon which Dunn rested much of its analytical framework,
Laufman v. Oakley Building & Loan Company, 237 and declared that Dunn
itself could hardly be considered an authoritative expression of the current
state of the law.
2 38
The Mackey court ruled that Laufman's holding that section 3604(a) im-
pliedly prohibits mortgage redlining was unnecessary to its decision because
section 3605 explicitly states such a prohibition.239 Mackey viewed Lauf-
230. See Badain, supra note 2, at 4-19. See also DeWolfe, Squires & DeWolfe, supra note
40, at 316-21.
231. Badain, supra note 2, at 34. Because redlining affects urban areas with high concen-
trations of minorities, an argument can be made that this impact amounts to de facto discrimi-
nation. Id. at 34-37.
232. 114 CONG. REC. 3422 (1968) (remarks of Sen. Mondale). Redlining frustrates the
achievement of this goal. Badain, supra note 2, at 68.
233. Mackey, 724 F.2d at 424.
234. Badain, supra note 2, at 2.
235. Id. at 36-37.
236. Mackey, 724 F.2d at 424.
237. 408 F. Supp. 489 (S.D. Ohio 1976).
238. Mackey, 724 F.2d at 424.
239. Id. The court states: "That holding was clearly unnecessary to the court's decision,
for the discrimination in financing was clearly within the explicit prohibition of [§ 3605]." Id.
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man as an overly broad and factually distinguishable decision. Because of
Dunn's reliance on Laufman, the Mackey court found Dunn
unpersuasive."'
Here again, however, Mackey suffers from analytical myopia. Rather
than being an exercise in judicial bootstrapping, Laufman's construction of
section 3604(a) was well-founded.24' Turning aside the repeated requests of
the defendants in that case to construe the section narrowly, the Laufman
court held that the section applied to much more than the mere words in its
title-"Discrimination in the sale or rental of housing." '242 The district
court in Laufman cited several cases in which the section was held to forbid
a disparate array of practices.24 3 In light of this judicial history, the court
rejected the defendant's argument that section 3604 applied solely to dis-
crimination in the sale or rental of housing.244 In sum, Mackey failed to
consider that the Laufman court "view[ed] sections 3604 and 3605 as being
collateral provisions entitled to great weight."
245
Further, the Fourth Circuit was deaf to the Supreme Court's admonition
that the Act be given "a generous construction. ,241 Instead, it did precisely
the opposite. Both the Laufman and Dunn courts were cognizant of other
constructions courts had given the disputed sections. 247 Both emphasized
the wide variety of factual circumstances among those cases, and incorpo-
rated the flexibility shown by other courts when construing the Act.248 The
complete failure of the Mackey court to acknowledge this flexibility is strik-
ing. Indeed, the avoidance of prior case law interpreting the Act undermines
the authority of this decision. By failing either to distinguish or dispute
240. Id. "The conclusion in Laufman that discrimination in financing is impliedly prohib-
ited by [§ 3604] lends little support to Dunn's holding that discrimination in the provision of
insurance is also impliedly included." Id.
The court ignores the precedential value of multistep title VIII arguments. See United
States v. American Inst. of Real Estate Appraisers, 442 F. Supp. 1072 (N.D. Ill. 1977), appeal
dismissed, 590 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1978), where the court used a multistep analysis in forbid-
ding the use of racially discriminatory appraisal standards. 442 F. Supp. at 1079. It would
seem this decision provides firm precedent for the two-step analysis employed by Dunn. See
Comment, supra note 2, at 478-79.
241. See supra notes 158-69 and accompanying text.
242. Laufman, 408 F. Supp. at 492.
243. See id. at 492-93.
244. "In view of the wide applicability of § 3604, defendants' suggestion that § 3604 should
be limited to discrimination in the sale or rental of housing in some narrow sense loses much of
its force." Id. at 493.
245. Id.
246. Traflicante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 212 (1972).
247. See supra notes 143-50. The conclusion reached in Dunn comports with traditional
methods of statutory interpretation. See Comment, supra note 2, at 484 & n.94. Mackey
strays far from these accepted norms.
248. See supra notes 143-50 and accompanying text.
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those cases, Mackey is analytically difficult to support. Mackey thus stands
for a judicial construction vastly out of step, in both temperament and analy-
sis, with the majority of federal courts today.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Mackey v. Nationwide Insurance Companies, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit greatly restricted the statutory construction
of the Fair Housing Act. By refusing to include insurance redlining within
the scope of the Act, the court in effect sanctioned the continuing unavaila-
bility of housing based on discrimination. The credibility of the Mackey
court is weakened by its result oriented approach to discovering legislative
intent. By refusing to comprehend the true nature of redlining, the court
misconstrued the purpose of both the Fair Housing Act and related
legislation.
By steadfastly refusing to acknowledge numerous cases broadly constru-
ing the Act, and by ignoring the Supreme Court's admonition that the Act
warrants a broad construction, the Fourth Circuit in Mackey rendered an
analytically unsound decision. With a split in the circuits possible,249 the
Supreme Court may yet give the Act its full due by proclaiming that it pro-
hibits insurance redlining. In so doing, the Court would give full expression
to congressional intent, and would provide another step in this nation's jour-
ney toward truly fair housing.
John Hugh Gilmore
249. See supra note 41.
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